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Abstract— Content Centric Networking (CCN) has introduced 
new concepts and ideas in the next generation routing protocols 
research area, proposing an alternative approach to the well 
known and consolidated TCP/IP protocol suite. CCN envisions a 
network of smart caching devices that not only transport bits 
from one place to another but also support the network to 
provide end users with what they are really interested in: named 
data. However, while a large portion of the existing literature 
highlights the benefits of this new network paradigm, we focus on 
some specific security issues related to the opportunity of 
mounting distributed denial of service attacks, commonly known 
as Interest Flooding Attack (IFA). Our results confirm this 
possibility and assess the behavior of state of the art tools 
designed to mitigate this problem. We run different simulation 
campaigns in a real deployment scenario to support our 
evaluation. 
Content Centric Networking, interest flooding attack, security, 
DoS, simulation 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Networks have dramatically evolved towards content 
diffusion: services like on-demand video streaming, social 
networking and many others, have become the core business of 
the modern Internet. Despite this clear and straightforward 
evolution, the communication paradigm is essentially still 
based on point-to-point channels connecting two network 
nodes without any specific support for applications that do 
focus on content diffusion and retrieval. Starting from this 
evident dyscrasia, new ideas and protocols have been proposed 
to solve the mismatch: CCN [1] is certainly one of the most 
promising, proposing a network of nodes capable of delivering 
data by just looking at the name of the resources requested by 
clients and completely abandoning the approach based on 
location dependent host addresses. This vision augments the 
range of possible functionalities we can implement on board of 
routers, enabling either data caching at packet granularity and 
also the exploitation of smart management algorithms to 
increase network efficiency (from the user perspective) and 
maximize revenues (from the operator point of view). 
While a wide part of the existing literature focuses and 
highlights the various benefits that may be achieved by the data 
centric proposal, this paper specifically tackles the security 
aspects related to a Denial of Service attack that could be 
implemented on top of CCN. This attack is also known in the 
literature as Interest Flooding Attack, meaning one or more end 
users flooding the network with Interests targeted at non 
existing resources, which only waste router memory and CPU 
resources. While traditional DoS attacks are usually targeted at 
the end user resources depletion or damaging, in CCN there 
exists the possibility to target intermediate nodes, i.e. routers 
belonging to the service provider network, thanks to the stateful 
nature of the proposed protocol. As a consequence, the 
potential impact of such type of attack is way greater and can 
potentially affect many more users. In this context, we aim to 
assess the existing countermeasures and evaluate their 
performance on a real ISP network, considering in particular 
the backbone network of Telecom Italia, a prominent Italian 
ISP. Simulations are designed to obtain a fair and significant 
comparison for all the considered countermeasures since the 
network topology and the network traffic are kept uniform 
during all the tests performed. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first 
introduce the basic foundation of the CCN protocol functioning 
(Section II), we present the basic attack aimed at overloading 
CCN routers and give an overview about existing work and 
research directions (Section III). Then, we dive into the current 
frameworks designed to mitigate the abovementioned security 
threats and present our simulation results showing their 
performance by means of our custom implementation of such 
mechanisms over the ndnSim simulator [13] (Section IV). We 
finally conclude this work and draw up some possible future 
contributions in Section V. 
II. BACKGROUND 
CCN is built around the key concept of name. Each piece of 
data has a unique name through which it is uniquely 
identifiable and reachable throughout the network. These 
names have a hierarchical structure so as to make the routing 
infrastructure more efficient and scalable.  
The packets used in the CCN universe belong to two 
categories: (i) the Interest is the packet used to request a piece 
of content. Basically, it has no payload and just carries the 
information about the wished content and some other 
information useful for packet processing and forwarding, (ii) 
the Data is the packet used by content providers to issue 
responses. It includes the name of the transported content and 
the digital signature of its payload. Security in CCN is 
managed by means of per packet signature which ensures data 
authenticity and integrity. 
The focus of this paper is especially placed on the Pending 
Interest Table (PIT) because all the traffic state information are 
essentially stored there and the amount of memory destined to 
it cannot be more than some hundreds of MBs, given the actual 
RAM technology of modern high-end routers, as discussed in 
[4]. For this reason, the PIT quickly becomes a possible point 
of failure for the entire infrastructure and a powerful attack 
vector, hence we need to quantify this threat in a real world 
topology with a realistic workload. 
III. INTEREST FLOODING ATTACK 
In traditional IP networks, DDoS attacks usually plague end 
terminals since the connection information state is kept by 
these devices. On the other hand, CCN is hardly based on the 
fact that intermediate routers maintain per packet state. This 
feature allows the protocol to avoid routing loops since each 
Interest is recorded into the PIT table, and also to implement 
native multicast support because each node “remembers” who 
asked for what. However this feature arms attacking users 
because, as we will show in this section, there exist the 
possibility to artificially generate forged packets with the only 
aim of wasting router memory. In particular, let us consider the 
scenario depicted in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 Interest Flooding Attack example 
 
The attacker needs to announce a valid prefix to send fake 
Interests to; in our example, “/com/badContent/*” serves to this 
purpose and let us call that node “prefix Hijacker”. In addition, 
the attacker needs one or more zombie clients (or even a large 
botnet) to start sending Interests targeted at the existing prefix 
but with non existing (and possibly long) resource names, for 
example “/com/badContent/abcdefg…z”. Such packets will 
correctly reach the prefix Hijacker, i.e. the machine configured 
to receive these datagrams without generating any response, 
but no useful data will be sent back. With this simple 
procedure, all the Interests seen by R1 (and for which R1 
creates an entry in the PIT) will remain in the device memory 
until the timeout, called LifeTime
1
, expires. 
The IFA is analyzed in several papers, which also discuss 
some possible solutions. For example, [5, 6, 7, 8, 9] contain a 
preliminary evaluation of possible security threats applicable to 
the CCN/NDN architecture. To the best of our knowledge, 
three main proposals are targeting the specific problem of IFA. 
The work by Afanasyev et al.[10] presents a framework named 
Satisfaction Based Pushback to limit the number of forwarded 
Interests for a given prefix depending on statistics about the 
Interest satisfaction ratio. Another countermeasure, referred to 
as Poseidon, is presented in [11]. This approach is similar to 
                                                          
1 The Lifetime is set by the client within the Interest packet so the router has 
no control over it. 
the previous one in that it gathers statistics about the traffic 
seen at each router but with a different activation procedure, as 
we will show in the following. The last solution we will 
consider, referred to as Traceback, is described in [12]. The 
idea is to activate a countermeasure after the memory usage has 
reached a predefined threshold. The algorithm consists in 
generating spoofed Data packets for the entries that are causing 
the memory overflow problem. Our goal is to evaluate and 
compare them in our use case scenario, i.e. the network of the 
main Italian service provider. 
IV. COUNTERMEASURES 
A. Satisfaction based pushback 
The Satisfaction based pushback algorithm is described in 
[10] and it works as follow: each router computes the Interest 
satisfaction metric as the ratio between the number of satisfied 
Interests over the number of forwarded Interests. This 
computation is performed on a per interface basis and it is an 
indication about the probability of an Interest coming from a 
certain interface to be satisfied. Such metric can be directly 
used to calculate the limits of Interests the router is willing to 
forward from each interface. After the computation, the router 
announces its limits to downstream neighbors in order to rate 
limit the incoming traffic, especially for those interfaces that 
are increasing the burden on the PIT memory occupancy. After 
some time, the router computes new statistics and clears its 
history with an exponential decay, in order to restore the 
original limits and give a chance to each interface to have more 
virtuous Interests forwarded again. Notice that metrics about 
the traffic may be collected at different granularities: prefixes, 
FIB entries and so on. 
B. Interest Traceback 
The Traceback algorithm is described in [12] and it is 
designed to release the unwanted PIT entries when the 
available amount of memory space falls under a predefined 
threshold. The detection phase is rather simple and only 
requires to monitor the PIT memory usage over time. After 
detecting an abnormal memory occupancy, the Traceback 
process is triggered and a set of spoofed Data packet are 
generated for those entries that remained unsatisfied for a long 
time. The spoofed Data packets carry the name needed to 
satisfy the offending Interests and are forwarded downstream to 
release resources all along the path. 
In order to leverage, as much as possible, the memory space 
available to the PIT, we defined the threshold after which the 
Traceback is activated, as 90% of the occupied memory. Such 
aggressive limit avoids algorithm overreacting and allows the 
network to support temporary traffic peak without triggering 
any Interests blocking mechanism. Since some implementation 
details were omitted in the reference paper, we designed our 
code to meet as close as possible, the countermeasure 
description. In particular, we simulate for each router a 
monitoring process which is scheduled every second to check if 
the memory occupancy is over its alarming value. If (and only 
if) it exceeds our threshold (over 90% memory occupancy), we 
invoke the FindAndSend() function to generate spoofed Data 
packets and make them travel towards the attack initiator. A 
Normal User
Attacker
Normal Content Provider
Prefix Hijacker
/com/badContent/*
/com/youtube/*
R1
simplified high level vision of our implementation can be seen 
in Algorithm 1. 
 
Algorithm 1 Traceback sending spoofed Data 
C. Poseidon 
Poseidon[11] is a framework to mitigate the effect of the 
IFA on CCN/NDN networks. It shares some similarities with 
the previous approach since it also collects statistics by 
observing the forwarded traffic. The main difference is in the 
detection phase: Poseidon is triggered when two metrics 
exceed their corresponding thresholds. The two parameters 
used by Poseidon are defined as follows: 
1) 𝜔 𝑟𝑖
𝑗
, 𝑡𝑘 =  
# 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑠  𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚  𝑟𝑖
𝑗
 𝑎𝑡  𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒  𝑡𝑘
# 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎  𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚  𝑟𝑖
𝑗
 𝑎𝑡  𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒  𝑡𝑘
 
2) 𝜌 𝑟𝑖
𝑗
, 𝑡𝑘 = # 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝐼𝑇 𝑏𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑟𝑖
𝑗
 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑘  
In order for Poseidon to be activated, both of these two 
metrics must exceed the allowed value. The algorithm uses 
both in order to limit the number of false positive, namely the 
number of times it erroneously detects an in progress attack.  
Poseidon reacts to an attack detection by imposing limits on 
the number of accepted Interests from the interface which 
exceeded both thresholds and lowering them for that interface. 
After some time, if the traffic becomes normal again, Poseidon 
will restore all the thresholds to their original values and the 
imposed limits are deactivated. 
D. Simulation Scenario 
Our simulation scenario is the network of the main Italian 
service provider, Telecom Italia (TI), whose logical topology 
is publicly available in [2] and exploited in [9], with PoP 
(Point of Presence) granularity. The connection between each 
user and its corresponding POP is modeled as an ADSL line 
with 7Mbps/1Mbps downlink/uplink bandwidth because these 
are very common values for TI domestic DSL contracts. The 
total number of customers is around 10 million and their 
distribution in the network is coherent with the population 
density of each province. The PIT size has been set to 1 GB in 
order to consider a static RAM based implementation and 
meet current hardware technology advances. See [4] for a 
deeper insight on this topic. 
To load our network, we implement download arrivals at 
each client side and limit customers to download just one file 
at a time, for simplicity and scalability of the simulations. 
Each file to be requested is selected among the global 
resources catalog with a Zipf probability distribution having 
𝛼 = 0.55 and 𝑞 = 25 as in [9]. This traffic load represents our 
baseline for all the simulations. 
The attacker model is rather simple since it generates 
Interest packets at the maximum speed allowed by its uplink 
bandwidth. We distributed many attackers around the network, 
targeting the same prefix in order to concentrate the effects on 
a central device, which, in our scenario, is the Rome PoP. For 
this reason and also for the sake of brevity, we provide results 
and metrics only for this network appliance. One prefix 
Hijacker node is directly connected to the Rome PoP to attract 
all the fake Interests and discard them. Such behavior makes 
PIT entries unsatisfied for the whole Lifetime thus wasting 
precious memory portions. 
E. Simulation results 
We run each scenarios with our customized version of the 
ndnSim simulator and provide simulation results either in terms 
of memory performance (RAM usage) and also in terms of the 
overall network functioning (percentage of retransmissions and 
total number of completed downloads). We report the RAM 
usage as the amount of memory occupied just by the PIT in a 
stable situation, i.e., after any transient has disappeared.  
After implementing the countermeasures in the network, we 
run a simulation campaign for each of them and obtained the 
results depicted in Table 1. Attack bandwidth has been varied 
in the range [0 – 4] Gbps. Notice that the max attack bandwidth 
(4Gbps) is perfectly feasible since many security reports[3] 
confirm the possibility to obtain an aggregate attack bandwidth 
even higher than 10 Gbps. We start our analysis with the 
Pushback algorithm. As we can see from the results, an 
increasing attack bandwidth causes a worse network 
performance, especially considering the overall number of 
downloaded files. The surprising result is that the 
countermeasure limits the network also in case of low intensity 
attacks because the algorithm is designed to compute the 
maximum number of „acceptable‟ Interests and announce it to 
downstream routers. Since the fake Interest packets mix with 
normal requests, the resulting limit computed for the interfaces 
of the routers along the path targeted by the attacker, involves 
also part of the legitimate traffic. The worse performance 
cannot be captured in the retransmissions computation since, as 
previously mentioned, it is performed only for finished file 
transfers thus not taking into account downloads in progress at 
the end of our simulations. 
For what concerns the Traceback framework, results are 
definitely better and almost all the files are correctly delivered. 
Only in the last case, with an aggregate attack bandwidth of 4 
Gbps, some downloads are not completed. The reason is that 
we have some transients between each attack detection and the 
countermeasure deployment, so that some regular Interests are 
initially discarded by on path routers. After reaching the 
threshold set for the Traceback process (this only happens in 
the last two rows where the attacker band is equal or higher 
than 2Gbps), the countermeasure is triggered and the spoofed 
Data immediately release the memory wasted on intermediate 
nodes.  
void Traceback::FindAndSend()  
{  
    FOR EACH Entry in Pit  
        IF IsOld(Entry)  
            FOR EACH Face in Entry.FacesList  
                IF Face.IsConnectedToEndUser() 
                    BLOCK Face  
                ELSE  
                    GENERATE SpoofedData  
                    SEND SpoofedData through Face  
                END IF 
            END LOOP  
            RELEASE memory  
        END IF  
    END LOOP  
} 
Attack Bandwidth 
Retransmissions RAM Usage Total downloads 
Pushback Traceback Poseidon Pushback Traceback Poseidon Pushback Traceback Poseidon 
0 bps 0% 0% 0% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 2841000 2841000 2841000 
100 Mbps 0% 0% 0% 5% 5% 0.3% 2839500 2841000 2841000 
500 Mbps 2% 0% 0% 0.7% – 6.4% 25% 0.3% 2707000 2841000 2841000 
2Gbps ≈ 0% ≈ 0% ≈ 0% 0.7% – 6.4% 0.2% 0.3% 2706500 2841000 2841000 
4Gbps ≈ 0% 13% ≈ 0% 0.7% – 6.4% 0.2% 0.3% 2706500 2837500 2841000 
Table 1 Countermeasures simulations results with different attack bandwidths 
 
The routers, which give connectivity to end users as well as 
attackers, quickly identify the attack originator and lock the 
link. In this way the attacker activity is completely denied and 
the network operating restored, as proved by the good 
performance achieved in terms of finished downloads and 
memory usage. The number of retransmissions is slightly 
higher because, during the transient, some downloads may 
experience a slow down. 
The last framework under test is Poseidon. As evident from 
Table 1, simulation results are even better than the previous 
cases as confirmed by the total number of finished downloads, 
which is completely restored in all the considered attack 
scenarios. This is a positive consequence of the dynamic 
behavior of Poseidon and its combined usage of two 
parameters, ω e ρ.  
The considered thresholds are automatically lowered while 
the attack is starting, resulting in less probability for the 
attacker to have its Interests forwarded upstream. After the 
statistics become normal again (with an exponential decay 
law), thresholds are raised again to progressively reopen the 
link to the attacker. However, this oscillation is never 
dangerous for the network performance as the system performs 
an early detection of this phenomenon thanks to the monitoring 
process that is triggered with 1 second frequency, and the 
regular traffic is definitely not affected by the fake traffic. This 
last result reveals that Poseidon is the most resilient framework 
against IFA and can successfully shield the considered network 
topology under the assumptions made for the attacker behavior. 
V. CONCLUSION 
CCN is a fertile research area, attracting many contributions 
from different research groups within the Academia as well as 
in the Industry. In this paper, we focused on the specific 
problem of assessing current frameworks to mitigate the 
possibility to implement IFA on CCN networks. The main 
outcome is that Traceback and Poseidon are promising 
mechanisms to alleviate the problem while not affecting 
normal clients performance. Especially Poseidon and its 
algorithm consisting of two independent thresholds, revealed to 
be effective in all the considered scenarios and a promising 
general approach to solve the problem. 
Possible future work includes the analysis of more 
sophisticated attack behaviors, in order to prove the accuracy of 
these algorithms also in different use cases and with different 
network topologies. The final goal is to study further security 
issues related to the CCN protocol and ensuring an adequate 
level of security to the entire infrastructure, for example 
considering more PIT architectures and more traffic conditions. 
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